INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2022.2111580

@OPEN ACCESS

I"'>

Checkforupdatesl

Can Fiscal Recentralization Strengthen Local Government? The Case of Thailand
Bruce Gilley Ga and Sirisak Laochankham Gb
a
Department of Political Science, Portland State University, Portland, Oregon, USA; bCollege of Local Administration, Khon Kaen University,
Khon Kaen, Thailand

ABSTRACT
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Thailand in 2018 became the latest developing country to impose mandatory rules on its fiscal
policy that included a national limit on the accumulation of public debt and direct control of local
government budgets. Such fiscal recentralization is generally assumed in the literature on multilevel finance to weaken local economic, fiscal, and policy conditions. Yet a newer emphasis in this
literature asserts the potential value of central governments in steering and constraining local
governments through public finance. Such central steering may strengthen rather than weaken
local governments via fiscal, economic, and policy conditions. In this paper, we use the emergent
theory of pro-local fiscal recentralization to examine the initial evidence, as well as the emergent
opportunities, for local governments in Thailand. We find grounds for optimism that fiscal recen
tralization will have positive effects, and identify strategies for local governments to optimize those
effects. We conclude with recommendations for research and practice on fiscal recentralization in
other developing country contexts.
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Introduction
In the face of widening budget deficits and global finan
cial uncertainties, Thailand in 2018 became the latest
country to impose mandatory rules on its fiscal policy
that included a limit on the accumulation of public debt
and other measures to recentralize public finance. With
an authoritarian government in power and broad social
support on this issue, fiscal recentralization is likely to
remain a fundamental fact of public finance in Thailand
for the foreseeable future.
Rules-based fiscal recentralization differs from
standard austerity policies because of its long-term
and predictable impact on public finance, in con
trast to episodic fiscal recentralization during the
business cycle. As elsewhere in the developing
world, local governments in Thailand are heavily
dependent on the fiscal transfers and revenuesharing from the central government. As a result,
fiscal recentralization through a national debt-brake
and other associated budgeting rules affects these
governments in multiple ways. It also creates new
dynamics of central-local relations. What will be the
effects on local governments?
In this article, we outline a framework for examining
the effects of fiscal recentralization on local govern
ments, using Thailand as the case study. By “local gov
ernment” in Thailand we refer mainly to the 7,800
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decentralized “local” administrative bodies at the pro
vincial, district, municipal, and sub-district (or tambon)
levels rather than to the 8,100 deconcentrated “provin
cial government” bodies at these levels. Even so, the
substantial overlap between the responsibilities, revenue
sources, and policy priorities of these two types of
locally-based government means that our analysis has
implications for latter as well.
We identify three causal pathways – fiscal, macroeconomic, and policy-based – through which fiscal
recentralization will reshape local government affairs.
We then examine both initial evidence and emerging
strategies available to local governments in the face of
this momentous change. The purpose is to provide
a framework for both research and practice that can be
applied to other developing country contexts.
Our focus on local government stems from two
related concerns. First, as in many decentralized
developing countries, local governments in
Thailand are the engines of development adminis
tration. They are the main conduits of public direct
investment, accounting for over half of government
spending in this area (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2019b, p. 222).
Therefore, the effects of fiscal recentralization on
local governments have wide implications for
national development as a whole.
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Second, the role of local governments in innova
tion may be particularly pronounced as countries
emerge from the COVID crisis because of how the
crisis has sometimes weakened national political insti
tutions. The United Nations Development
Programme describes the enhanced role of local gov
ernments in Latin America as a “positive externality”
of the crisis and calls for efforts “to strengthen local
governments as the axis of transformation and inno
vations for effective governance.” (Acuña-Alfaro &
Cruz-Osorio, 2021) We believe that this logic applies
to Thailand as well where local governments have
been at the forefront of the COVID response because
of their control of public health funds and their
knowledge of local conditions, according to the case
studies of the municipalities of Rangsit and Chiang
Mai by Vongsayan & Nethipo (Vongsayan & Nethipo,
2021).
The article begins with a theoretical statement drawn
from recent trends in the multi-level finance literature
which we label “pro-local fiscal recentralization.” The
purpose of the paper is to apply this lens prospectively to
the Thai case. As such, our approach is consciously
deductive, beginning with a theoretical statement and
then examining its validity with respect to emergent (i.e.
incomplete) and formative (i.e. process-based rather
than outcome-based) data. We examine official docu
ments, local government practices, and budget data in
order to evaluate whether this evidence shows a likely
positive result from fiscal recentralization consistent
with the theory.
The article proceeds in six parts. After introducing
the concept of pro-local fiscal recentralization, we pro
vide descriptive information on fiscal recentralization in
Thailand since 2018. This is followed by sections on the
three causal pathways – fiscal, macro-economic, and
policy-based – through which fiscal recentralization is
shaping local government affairs. In each case, we con
sider both probabilistic initial evidence, as well as “pos
sibilistic” opportunities for improved local government
performance. We conclude with thoughts on how these
dynamics may reshape public finance in Thailand and
recommendations for research and practice in other
contexts.

Pro-local fiscal recentralization
This article is located within the large literature on
multi-level public finance and its effects on fiscal condi
tions, macroeconomic stability, and policy goals. This
literature tends to divide between developed and devel
oping countries because in the latter both governance
and decentralization remain uninstitutionalized and

thus fiscal relations are subject to significant uncertainty
and change. We limit our review mostly to the develop
ing country literature.
Much of the developing country literature on multilevel finance was rooted in the democratization wave of
the 1990s and 2000s. It was “decentralizing” and “expan
sionist” in its orientation, focused on how central gov
ernments could provide more funds to local
governments, more reliable and equal transfers to differ
ent units, and greater local autonomy in fiscal policy,
notably in a World Bank report of 2007 (Boadway &
Shah, 2007). The dominant view was that an institutio
nalized and expansive decentralization would improve
fiscal accountability and the achievement of locallydriven economic and policy goals.
Today, there is a rebalancing of perspectives that
asserts the importance of central governments in steer
ing and constraining local governments through public
finance, evident in a summative volume of 2018 by Bahl
and Bird (Bahl & Bird, 2018). This may be to achieve
macro-economic stability (a concern missing from the
earlier literature) as well as to encourage local revenue
mobilization (which has disappointed under fiscal
decentralization). There is also a new appreciation of
the importance of local governments being aligned with
nationally-determined policy goals. This newer balan
cing of earlier perspectives provides insights into how
fiscal recentralization under formal rules such as a debt
brake could prove beneficial to local governments along
side more obvious challenges.
To start, local governments can play an important
role in contributing to fiscal balance and resulting
macro-economic stability through the non-negotiable
operation of a debt brake that compels them to support
conditions in which they have a self-interest. For exam
ple, an Asian Development Bank report of 2002 noted
that laws requiring that a fixed proportion of central
revenues be given to local governments may have unin
tended consequences when central governments raise
taxes in order to narrow budget deficits. “Since local
jurisdictions cannot be expected to have a concern for
macroeconomic stability, the additional transfers will be
spent, contrary to good macroeconomic policy,” the
ADB noted (Schroeder & Smoke, 2002, p. 36).
Similarly, Bahl and Bird note the challenges of achieving
macro-economic stability when local governments have
too much spending and revenue autonomy: “Regional
and local governments may in various ways make it
more difficult for the central government to implement
potentially important stabilization policies.” (Bahl &
Bird, 2018, p. 23)
While in theory, fiscal decentralization could be
coupled with local government debt brakes, studies of
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Germany (Zabler, forthcoming) and Ecuador
(Zambrano-Gutiérrez & Avellaneda, 2022) show that
such brakes are usually not effective given local incen
tives to overspend and under tax. As a result, balancing
budgets for the purposes of macro-economic stability
usually requires some degree of fiscal recentralization.
In terms of fiscal revenues, the downside of large and
fixed transfers to local governments as advocated by the
“localist” literature is that they may undermine local tax
efforts, which not surprisingly have remained largely
unchanged despite decades of encouragement from the
research community. Such transfers, note Bahl and Bird,
“may so dwarf the revenue-raising potential of subnational governments that they are discouraging from
making more effort to raise their own taxes.” (Bahl &
Bird, 2018, p. 319) By locking in declining central trans
fers, fiscal recentralization creates incentives for local
revenue efforts, especially the administrative capacity
needed to achieve them. This greater fiscal strength
may in turn provide the resources for local economic
development. Su and Canh find in a study of 63 pro
vinces in Vietnam from 2006 to 2017 that provinces that
boosted their own-income share of their budget tended
to attract more investment and to create more positive
macroeconomic conditions, both of which raised local
productivity (Dinh & Nguyen, 2022).
In terms of policy goals, the dominant “benefit
model” of the early fiscal decentralization literature
argued that policy choices are best left to local govern
ments because they can more precisely target those who
benefit in order to raise revenues (or garner votes). This
simplistic rational choice model, however, ignored many
extenuating factors that may argue for greater fiscal
centralization for policy purposes. The Asian
Development Bank noted, for instance, that some local
governments may be more effective in delivering public
services that have spillover effects into nearby regions. In
that case, equalization rules on transfers may unduly
constrain national policy goals and burden some local
governments with policy mandates that should be taken
up by neighboring sub-national units (Schroeder &
Smoke, 2002, pp. 21–23, 46).
Central governments are also better off retaining
a steering role where local governments are unable to
fulfill central priorities in areas like health, education,
and infrastructure. Reviewing several studies, Birner and
Braun argue that poverty reduction in developing coun
tries is better done from central ministries because local
governments tend to favor the (voting) non-poor in
their spending (Birner & Braun, 2015). The assumption
that those powers should be put under local govern
ments under general grants, observe Bahl and Bird,
ignores how “central governments force or induce local
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governments to act in accordance with national policy
objectives”, and these objectives may ultimately be in the
local interest (Bahl & Bird, 2018, p. 172)
A World Bank paper of 2004 noted that some
central governments made transfers contingent on
results at the local level while allowing local choices
on means (Shah, 2004, pp. 10, 15, 31). An emergent
idea of “contractual” fiscal relations, where fiscal
transfers are made through contracts with local gov
ernments, goes a long way to redress the “localist”
bias in the earlier literature. In particular, central
governments with limited (or debt braked) fiscal
resources may contract with the local governments
that have the greatest vertical (in carrying out central
policy priorities) or horizontal (in delivering public
services with benefits to other local governments)
effectiveness. This would “lead to greater efficiency
and foster political accountability,” writes Spahn
(Spahn, 2015, p. 149).
A second broad thrust in the literature that redresses
the earlier decentralizing approach is an emergent focus
on context-specific solutions as opposed to “best prac
tice” that assumes a single best model. “Perhaps the
most important lesson one can learn . . . is that there is
no one best way to get it right,” note Bahl and Bird
(Bahl & Bird, 2018, p. 3). In particular, Asian countries
like Thailand have often adopted asymmetric decentra
lization that variably empowers local governments in
different ways despite their equal legal status, including
with optional functions (“must do” versus “may do”)
and with variously overlapping responsibilities with the
central government or its deconcentrated provincial
units, according to an OECD survey (Chatry &
Vincent, 2019, p. 38). This includes not just special
rights for major metropolitan areas (in Thailand’s case
Bangkok) but a preference for conditional grants over
guaranteed transfers. As Bahl and Bird advise on the
adoption of flexible funding models for local govern
ments: “Mistakes in designing grants are easier to fix
than mistakes in designing constitutions.” (Bahl & Bird,
2018, p. 87)
This contextualist approach is important under
a non-negotiable debt brake because other fiscal goals
like participatory budgeting must take a back seat and
are thus subject to contingent implementation. What is
important is that this shift in process does not necessarily
portend a worsening of outcomes for local governments.
Instead, the new fiscal rules may encourage local fiscal
capacity-building, macro-economic stability that bene
fits local economies, and incentives for policy innovation
and effectiveness at the local level. For this reason, we
refer to this emergent idea in multi-level finance as “prolocal fiscal recentralization.”
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Fiscal recentralization in Thailand
Thailand’s public debt, which is almost entirely owned
by the central government, hit a then-record high of the
equivalent of 58% of GDP in 2000 as a result of the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 (International Monetary
Fund, 2022c). Despite many populist spending pro
grams, the prime minister from 2001 to 2006, Thaksin
Shinawatra, reduced debt to 39% of GDP by 2006, when
he was overthrown in a military coup. This was done
through annual “frameworks” put in place from 2002
that set targets to keep debt below 60% (and then 50%)
of GDP. Thaksin also initiated performance-based bud
geting that reduced the discretionary spending tradi
tionally available to the central bureaucracy, one
reason for his unpopularity with the central state as
one of the consultants overseeing the Australianfunded fiscal decentralization reforms noted (Dixon,
2005) In this sense, fiscal recentralization in Thailand
really began with the 2006 overthrow of Thaksin.
In the shadow of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007
to 2009, many developing countries faced a severe loss of
investor confidence. In Thailand, fiscal austerity result
ing from the crisis led to ad hoc retrenchment by local
governments, mainly by deferring capital spending,
drawing down reserves, and cutting spending on social
welfare, impacting the least advantaged, as shown by
Krueathep’s survey of 900 municipal governments
(Krueathep, 2013).
While the Thaksin governments had reduced public
indebtedness, they were perceived by conservatives in
Thailand as opening the spending floodgates with fiscal
decentralization that would eventually bankrupt the
country. The 2011 Local Administrative Organization
Revenue Act created a new institution – the Local
Administrative Organization Revenue Committee –
chaired by the minister of finance to directly control
local spending. After Thaksin’s successor party won
national elections that year, recentralization came
under threat, one reason the military overthrew the
government in a second coup of 2014.
In a 2015 book on Thaksin’s “toxic fiscal democracy”,
the Chulalongkorn University political science professor
(and later military junta member) Charas Suwanmala
called for a further institutionalization of fiscal recentra
lization through a binding debt brake (Suwanmala,
2015). The perception was that, given rational expecta
tions among well-informed market participants,
a failure by a small open economy like Thailand to
reckon with its rising debt might trigger the sort of
economic austerity that a debt-brake could forestall.
The military government obliged with two laws in
2018, the Fiscal Responsibility Act and a revised Budget

Procedure Act, that followed patterns elsewhere. As two
Ministry of Finance economists showed in that year, the
shift was motivated by an urgent sense of vulnerabil
ity after seeing the effects of the Global Financial
Crisis on European countries, especially Greece, and
a run of budget deficits in Thailand of 18 out of
21 years since the Asian Financial Crisis. As they
wrote, debt fears among investors “could stagger the
confidence of the country, giving rise to the emer
gence of a sovereign and banking crises which
require remedial actions from the government . . .
and eventually setting in motion a vicious cycle.”
(Asavavallobh et al., 2018, p. 124)
The new laws recentralized budgeting powers in
many ways. Most important, the laws imposed a 60%
of GDP limit on public debt (since raised to 70%),
mimicking the 60% limit adopted by the European
Union’s 2012 Fiscal Compact rule. Even that was seen
as too high by three Thai economists who concluded in
2020 using data from 1998 to 2017 that public debt over
42% of GDP for Thailand would constrain growth. They
urged an eventual reduction of the debt limit to 44% to
guard against a sudden rise in the costs of rolling over
the debt (Tangkanjanapas et al., 2020).
While many developing countries have adopted fiscal
recentralization in order to control public debt, very few
have followed the approach of a legally binding and
enforced debt brake. By the end of 2021, Thailand was
one of only 22 countries with formal fiscal rules that
included a limit on public debt (International Monetary
Fund, 2022a). Among developing countries, according
to the IMF dataset, only Thailand, Vietnam, Botswana,
Pakistan, Malaysia, Iran, and Indonesia have debt brakes
that are closely followed. It is notable, then, that
Southeast Asia accounts for four of seven such cases.
A second major change with fiscal recentralization
was to give the central Budget Bureau under the Office
of the Prime Minister direct control over local govern
ment budget allocations, changing the previous system
in which such allocations were made through the
Ministry of the Interior. Local governments now coor
dinate with the provincial offices of the Budget Bureau to
develop their plans in coordination with national stra
tegic priorities. Only the deconcentrated provincial gov
ernments continue to receive allocations from the
Ministry of the Interior, although since 2007 they have
also been able to make direct budget requests to the
Budget Bureau (Government of Thailand, 2020a).
A 2022 draft revision of the Local Government
Organization Code would allow the Ministry of the
Interior to impose direct rule over any local government,
a power previously reserved for the deconcentrated pro
vincial governments (Nitikorn, 2022).
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Fiscal recentralization in Thailand took effect just before
the global pandemic pushed the country’s finances deeper
into trouble. Public debt rose to 58% of GDP in 2021 and is
forecast to reach 62% by the end of 2022. This was a result
of both falling revenues and of voluntary fiscal expansion
(automatic fiscal stabilizers in Thailand are relatively weak;
World Bank, 2021, p. 24). The expansion was mainly
through direct spending by the central government rather
than through local governments. Local government reven
ues fell by 12% between the 2020 and 2022 fiscal years
(fiscal years run until end-September) while the revenues of
deconcentrated provincial governments fell by 10% (see
Chart 1) (Government of Thailand, 2022f).
The political will behind the debt brake was evident
from the 2023 budget cycle. The IMF advocated
a nominal 13% increase in budgetary expenditures,
bursting the limits of the debt brake (International
Monetary Fund, 2021, pp. 13, 54). While this would
ease the immediate pain of the debt brake, it would
also set back the achievement of the macro-economic
gains that the brake was supposed to achieve. The Thai
government rejected this advice. The budget passed for
fiscal year 2023 (ending September 2023) contained only
a 4% increase in local government shared revenues and
subsidies (and a smaller increase in budgets for decon
centrated provincial governments), both of which

Chart 1.
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represent real declines as inflation was expected to
remain above 5% during 2023.

Fiscal effects
Under conditions of slow or negligible economic growth
and continued adherence to the debt brake, declining
budgets will be normal for local governments in
Thailand for the foreseeable future. This has brought
into sharp focus a long-standing and largely unresolved
challenge for local governments in developing countries
like Thailand: the small proportion of their budgets
generated by local taxation and fees. Metasuttirat and
Wangkanond note that this problem was identified in
Thailand shortly after the country’s decentralizing con
stitution of 1997, but remained unresolved even with
fiscal decentralization (Metasuttirat & Wangkanond,
2017, p. 131). In 2010, the proportion of local govern
ment revenues from locally-levied taxes and fees was just
6% (Metasuttirat & Wangkanond, 2017, Table 1). The
figure rose slightly during the 2010s, reaching 15% in
2020 but fell to 9% in 2021 (Government of Thailand,
2022d). In FY2019, the last year for which detailed data
are available, own-source income accounted for only
16% of district and sub-district (tambon) revenues,
14% of Bangkok revenues, 8% of municipality revenues,
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Chart 2.

and 7% of provincial administration revenues (see
Chart 2).
As a general rule, local governments in Thailand have
highly undeveloped fiscal management systems, whether
in budgeting, expenditure, or tax collection, a fact recog
nized by local officials in a study 272 budget staff in
Rayong province carried out in 2014 by Khaikhuea and
Budsin (Khaikhuea & Budsin, 2015). This is a result of
fiscal dependency on transfers and shared revenues from
the central state. Thus, one reform with the 2011 Local
Administrative Organization Revenue Act was to give
local governments scope for revenue raising through
new environmental taxes, service fees, and other
approved “new taxes.” A Thai parliament report of
2022 urged the central government to remove further
barriers to local own-source revenues as a necessary
reform to accompany fiscal recentralization.
“Regulations should enable local administrations to
have more fiscal independence and reduce their reliance
on the central government’s budget,” stated a committee
report. “The past reliance on central government fund
ing has caused a lack of independence in designing and
creating service innovations and in increasing the effi
ciency of revenue collection and expanding the tax base”
(Government of Thailand, 2022b, p. 92).
The local property tax in Thailand remains by far the
most underdeveloped revenue source. Its full application
in Thailand, despite numerous exemptions, would
increase local own-taxes by 50% based on Ministry of
Finance estimates of losses during its suspension during
COVID (Chantanusornsiri, 2022). One ADB report esti
mated that property tax revenues could increase by six
times if Thailand achieved OECD levels in this category

(Asian Development Bank, 2022, p. 23). Yet as Bahl and
Bird note, the same things that experts like about the
property tax are those that make it challenging for
developing countries: its sticker shock visibility to
payers, debates on valuations, and the inability of longtime owners to pay as the amount rises (Bahl & Bird,
2018, ch. 6). In the five years to 2017, revenues from
property taxes in Thailand were on average the equiva
lent of just 0.23% of GDP, about a third of the already
very low level for developing countries as a whole. Over
the same period, the average in Indonesia was 0.41%
(International Monetary Fund, 2022b).
Meesook and colleagues, in a study of six tambon
governments in Ayutthaya province in 2016, found
that “valuation of land and building tax is very often
done arbitrarily” and that tax preferences depend on the
whims of tambon government leaders (Meesook et al.,
2020, p. 210). In his dissertation on private residential
property taxes in Bangkok from 2016 to 2019,
Maneepitak showed that the municipal government’s
reliance on outdated valuations led to spatial unfairness,
which reduced revenues due to sub-optimal supply
(Maneepitak, 2020).
There is evidence that fiscal recentralization has
prompted new property revenue efforts. In 2002, prop
erty valuation powers were placed under the Ministry of
Finance, which created new State Property Appraisal
Committees at the deconcentrated provincial govern
ment levels. As taxation experts have argued, such valua
tion and record-keeping “cadasters” in developing
countries are best maintained at the provincial or even
central level, or by a third-party independent agency, to
ensure efficiency and avoid corruption (Ahmad et al.,
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2015, pp. 403–407). The provincial committees barely
functioned however since property records came from
local governments. Following the post-2006 fiscal recen
tralization, local governments began to create the prop
erty record and administrative systems needed to
capture taxes on these valuations. Combined with tech
nical advances in geographic information systems, the
provincial appraisal committees in 2020 launch a fullyonline valuations database.
Related to this, in 2019, the central government
completed a major revision of the property tax –
renamed the “land and building tax” – with new higher
rates and broader coverage. Despite the immediate
suspension of the new law during the COVID pan
demic, local governments now have both the incentives
and the means to capture revenues once collections
restart beginning in the 2023 fiscal year. The govern
ment in Nonthaburi municipality, in the northern sub
urbs of Bangkok, for instance, issued valuation
statements in 2020 on major properties within the
municipality, averting the “sticker shock” problem
identified by Bahl and Bird (Government of
Nonthaburi Municipality, 2020). In Phuket municipal
ity, the deconcentrated provincial government has
taken the lead in capacity building for local tax collec
tion (Government of Thailand, 2021a). This initial and
process-oriented evidence suggests movement in the
right direction, which would end 30 years of inertia
on this major local fiscal issue.
Local governments also have control over an array of
fees – signage tax, slaughter duty, hotel occupancy fees,
and some business registration and retail shop fees. As
with property taxes, there is wide scope for local govern
ments to improve collection. Informal labor and busi
ness sectors are variously estimated to account for 43%
to 54% of Thailand’s non-agricultural workforce
(Komin et al., 2021) and 39% of GDP (Sotiyanurak,
2007). Bringing more labor and business into the formal
sector would not only increase fee collections, it would
also increase revenues from business and value-added
taxes that are shared with the central government.
In 2021, for instance, responding to local revenue
shortfalls, the central government updated the 1967
signage tax law. The revision included new categories
for digital, LED, and mobile signs, the ending of the
exemption for signs from state enterprises, and
a large increase in all rates, which were last updated
in 1992. This is a potentially significant shift since in
the Bangkok municipality, for instance, revenue from
the signage tax was 1,050 million baht (about
$33 million), or 18% of self-generated revenues in
FY2021, before the revision came into effect. Both
the amount and the proportion are expected to
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grow with the broader tax and a continued boom of
outdoor advertising (Techasiriprapha, 2022).
The other area where fiscal recentralization has
encouraged joint efforts to improve local revenues is
environmental taxes and service fees. As early as
2010, a Senate report urged the setting of new envir
onmental taxes that could be shared or wholly
locally-controlled: “This would give polluters an
incentive to reduce their pollution so that their fees
are reduced, while at the same time the local govern
ment or authorities can use their revenue from fees”
(Government of Thailand, 2010, p. 160). The nation
ally-collected excise taxes (only 10% of which go to
local governments) on oil products and automobiles
have proven inelastic sources of revenue despite
income and price effects as well as some temporary
suspensions during COVID (Government of
Thailand, 2022c; Metasuttirat & Wangkanond,
2017). A Thailand Development Research Institute
report urges that most of these excise revenues be
given exclusively to local governments, which would
have boosted local revenues by the equivalent of 38%
in 2021 (Phitidol, 2016).
One new regulation of 2019 allows local government
to retain all locally-set motor vehicle fees, road and
parking tolls, and fuel levies if they are earmarked for
low carbon transport policies. Another significant shift
was underway in 2022 to reform the management and
sharing of revenues from traffic fines to allow municipal
governments a great role and share of the revenues. At
present, roughly two thirds of all traffic fine revenues
nationally comes from Bangkok, indicative of a major
revenue source largely untapped in other municipalities
(Government of Thailand, 2022g).
Another area where fiscal recentralization has
spurred efforts at local revenue mobilization is on the
question of local government borrowing. An Asian
Development Bank report in 2003 highlighted the unde
veloped nature of local government credit markets –
bonds and bank loans – throughout Asia despite
expanded responsibilities under decentralization (Vera
& Kim, 2003). Only capital cities like Seoul and Taipei
had so far proven credit-worthy borrowers, which freed
up central government funds for other local govern
ments. The ADB subsequently wrote a six-volume hand
book to help local governments in Thailand access credit
markets (Asian Development Bank, 2009). But under
Thailand’s Public Debt Management Act, local govern
ment debt is not guaranteed, which means it is not
included in the national debt limit calculation. This
makes local government borrowing prohibitively expen
sive. In addition, since 2011, all local government bor
rowing has required Ministry of Interior approval.
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The combined result is hardly any local borrowing.
Provincial and local governments had only 36 billion
baht in outstanding debt at February 2022, or just 0.4%
of all public debt. This has remained virtually
unchanged since 2011 (Government of Thailand,
2022e). Attempts by the municipality of Bangkok to
issue bonds in the 2010s fell flat (Issarachaiyot, 2017).
When local governments borrow, it is mostly from the
Ministry of Finance or other state banks and financial
institutions and debts are rarely rolled over (Sithiyot
et al., 2015).
As part of the fiscal regime of 2018, new rules per
mitted local governments to borrow private funds and
for some approvals to be done by the deconcentrated
provincial governments (Government of Thailand,
2020b). A key shift in 2020 was to allow borrowing by
the lowest sub-district or tambon governments, of which
there are over 5,000. Under the new rules, borrowing
can be for three reasons: capital investment, to restruc
ture existing debt, or to raise working capital for pen
sions or local government-owned pawnshops (of which
there are 258 nation-wide). The rules outlined processes
for loan approval including measures to measure debt
sustainability and to ensure repayment schedules. In
2021, the Ministry of Finance created a dedicated portal
and offered training through Ministry of the Interior’s
Department of Local Administration so that local gov
ernments could report their debt obligations. This
resolved a long-standing problem of the random nature
of central monitoring of local debt (Kingphuang, 2013).
Coupled with new local government fiscal sustainability
stress tests being carried out under the prime minister’s
office (Patamasiriwat et al., 2022), this edged the country
closer to providing selective guarantees of local govern
ment debt, which the Ministry of Finance has had the
power to do since 2007.
Thailand’s fiscal recentralization thus has paradoxi
cally seen greater efforts in favor of local fiscal autonomy
than under the previous system. Two lessons emerge.
One is that while the negative fiscal effects of fiscal
recentralization on local governments are fast-moving,
the positive effects are slow-moving given the adminis
trative and economic noise associated with boosting
local revenues. The second is those positive effects are
dependent on central government support, and thus
fiscal recentralization works best when coupled with
new commitments to local fiscal health.

Macro-economic effects
While direct fiscal effects dominate the literature on
multi-level public finance, local government strength is
ultimately dependent on the broader political economy

in which local government operates. Strong economic
and political support may be more important to local
governments than fiscal transfers or revenue rights.
As a general rule, fiscal recentralization under a debt
brake is introduced in order to protect macroeconomic
stability and thus economic growth. Menkulasi’s regres
sion estimates for 17 developing countries before and
after the adoption of fiscal rules from 1984 to 2012 show
that they enhance growth when the rules protect invest
ment spending from cuts and when the mechanisms of
compliance are mainly internal to the government
(Menkulasi, 2016). Both of these conditions are true in
the Thai case. A more recent study of 43 African nations
finds robust evidence of the positive role of fiscal rules,
including debt brakes, on economic growth (Nabieu
et al., 2021). The primary mechanism through which
debt rules accelerate growth is through lower borrowing
costs according to Thorton and Vasilakis’s study of 61
developing countries for 1985 to 2017 (Thornton &
Vasilakis, 2020).
These findings may be particularly strong in the Thai
case because there is some evidence that public spending
is relatively inefficient. Suanin, using quarterly data from
1993 to 2014, finds that the growth effects of budgetary
spending are only half that of private investment on both
physical and human capital, and far less reliable (Suanin,
2015, Table 2). Simply restraining government spend
ing, then, may boost growth by releasing funds back into
the private sector. Thailand’s relatively rapid recovery
from the COVID pandemic shows a macro-economy in
robust shape despite the collapse of key industries like
tourism.
The second mechanism through which a debt brake
may improve local government resources is the extent to
which local governments capitalize upon healthy eco
nomic growth to develop new private financing options
for local development. To date, virtually all formal pri
vate financing projects (often called public-private part
nerships) in Thailand have been initiated by the central
government, led by central agencies, and centered on
infrastructure. Local governments “have not been given
true freedom in making decisions” to form their own
partnerships because “the bureaucratic administration
system of the center lacks the clarity and has
a complicated chain of authority and management
structure that is inconsistent with each local context,”
noted Chupradit and colleagues in 2019 (Chupradit
et al., 2019, p. 481).
We should expect that fiscal recentralization com
bined with strong macro-economics should encourage
more such partnerships, consistent with the findings
from Kopańska & Asinski from Poland that local gov
ernments with greater fiscal stress are more likely to seek
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private financing for public services (Kopańska &
Asinski, 2019). While formal PPPs remain caught in
central bureaucratic red tape, local government have
created many new informal private finance relationships
in response to fiscal recentralization and retrenchment.
The northeastern municipality of Roi-Et, for instance,
has since 2013 partnered with private investors to help
fund its child development and disaster mitigation pro
grams in an example of cross-jurisdiction cooperation
that involved four adjacent sub-districts (Sarakarn &
Karlers, 2018). The municipality of Khon Kaen and
four contiguous municipalities, to take another example,
have created an arms-length government special pur
pose vehicle in order to attract private finance for
a planned 26-km and 20 station light rail line costing
approximately TB17,358 million ($476 million;
Laochankham et al., forthcoming). Even more
unique, in 2022 the provincial and local governments
in Prachinburi province formed a service delivery
partnership with the foods and pharmaceuticals
giant TCP Group to provide targeted assistance to
impoverished households, including renovating their
homes (Matichon Online, 2022a).
Thailand’s post-2006 fiscal recentralization has been
accompanied by broad-based economic growth and
local governments have taken advantage of this to
strengthen their service delivery. The lesson here is
that local governments should identify opportunities
emerging from the positive indirect effects of macroeconomic stability even as they deal with the immediate
direct challenges of fiscal retrenchment.

Policy effects
Multi-level finance is ultimately about the multi-level
policy debates that involve the fiscal tool. With few
exceptions – such as the local government monopoly
over elder care, kindergarten, and firefighting, and the
national monopoly on defense, foreign affairs, courts,
and policing – all functions in Thailand are not just
legally but also practically shared (Laovakul, 2019,
p. 212). Thus, virtually every policy area involves multilevel policy bargaining.
In Riggs’s seminal study of 1966, Thailand was por
trayed as a “bureaucratic polity” dominated by the cen
tral bureaucracy and military where elected politicians
and even the monarchy were sidelined (Riggs, 1966).
Beginning with a formal law on decentralization in
1999, Thailand attempted to break this traditional struc
ture by empowering local governments to make their
own policy choices. But the twin coups against the
democratically-elected Thaksin governments stymied
further progress. In 2017, a Regional Development
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Policy Integration Committee was established to align
local development policies with national needs. The
committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and com
prises representatives from local governments, the pri
vate sector, and relevant central ministries.
Coupled with direct control and funding of local
government budgets, this policy integration was part of
an attempt to introduce more strategic and integrated
budgeting practices into Thai public finance, referred to
in the 2023 budget as “capacity building of local govern
ment organizations to increase mission transfer poten
tial.” (Government of Thailand, 2022a, p. 2) This means,
for example, that a municipal government with a feasible
plan for a bus rapid transit corridor could appeal for
a larger budget if such a plan was aligned with Ministry
of Transport goals. As a parliamentary report of 2022
put it: “Budgeting in future will require a review of the
local government’s drive to lead to the goals according to
the national strategy or the master plan under the strat
egy . . . The budget allocations of local governments
should be distributed based on the nature, prominence,
and potential of its national leadership in each area”
(Government of Thailand, 2022b, p. 97). In the 2022
fiscal year budget, 11% of all spending was allocated to
such strategic areas of economic development – a third
for transport and logistics and another third for unspe
cified “competitiveness” enhancements. Fiscal recentra
lization was thus part of a broader shift to bring local
governments into line with the national policy priorities
of the resilient “bureaucratic polity” in Thailand.
This has highlighted the challenges for local govern
ments of strengthening their political support by align
ing with central priorities without sacrificing their
autonomy. The results show both the threats and the
opportunities.
In one case, the central government in 2015 launched
a multi-sector development plan known as the Eastern
Economic Corridor that aims to raise 300 billion baht of
private investment per year, a significant leveraging of
the total of 82 billion baht of public funds invested in the
plan by the end of 2021 (Government of Thailand,
2021b). Essentially an attempt to disperse development
in Bangkok to the east, the centralized impetus of the
project has turned the three relevant local governments
at the provincial level – Chachoengsao, Chonburi and
Rayong – into little more than branch offices of the
central government, according to Klindee’s interviews
with provincial officials in Chonburi (Klindee, 2020).
On the other hand, a similar project launched in 2022
by the 20 provinces of the northeast known as the “Isan”
region calling itself the “Economic Center of the Greater
Mekong Sub-region” secured central funding for 410
transport and communications-related projects in the
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region for FY 2023 worth 10,764 million baht despite
being a local rather than central initiative (Matichon
Online, 2022b). Here, the impetus came from local
governments working in cooperation with the decon
centrated provincial governments. The OECD argues
that despite its centralizing tendency, the Regional
Development Policy Integration Committee also gives
local governments an unusual direct voice over
national policy priorities (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2019a, ch. 3) and that
the committee should be evaluated for possible appli
cation to local fiscal issues as well. By doing so,
“Thailand’s central government could create political
and financial incentives for [local governments] to
deliver services in ways that support important
national policy goals” (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2019a, ch.3)
Thus while the centralized bureaucratic polity is resi
lient, it has also created more opportunity structures for
local governments to gain authority by slipstreaming
with national policy aims. Writing as early as 2016,
Unger and Mahakanjana argued that a flexible and
responsive bureaucratic polity that ties local govern
ments to national strategic priorities may be “the best
option available” in Thailand (Unger & Mahakanjana,
2016, p. 186). The addition of the debt brake has thus
forced local governments to “sink or swim” in matters of
multi-level policy bargaining. If they do not take the
initiative and use their direct access to Bangkok, they
risk being swamped by centralized authority.

Conclusion
When and how does fiscal recentralization strengthen
local government? Our paper suggests several answers to
this question by examining fiscal, macro-economic, and
policy areas in the case of Thailand. It is clear that these
three mechanisms operate in different ways. In the fiscal
space, fiscal recentralization strengthens local govern
ment when the central level takes a pro-active and sup
portive approach to strengthening local revenue capacity
even as it puts new rules in place to determine and
monitor local budgets. In the case of macro-economic
effects, the results are more passive: as long as the central
government remains committed to regionally broadbased growth, the positive economic effects will be felt
by local governments but taking advantage of them
require local initiative. Finally, in the case of policy,
there is a more competitive, or negotiated, relationship
in which local governments are strengthened only to the
extent that they can act entrepreneurially to gain policy
authority at the expense of rival central (or deconcen
trated provincial) authorities.

The Thai case thus suggests then that the “recentra
lize” turn in the multi-level finance literature may reflect
realities on the ground. For that reason, scholars and
policy makers should continue to study carefully the
phased impacts of cases like Thailand to understand
the evolving relationship between fiscal rules and local
government performance.
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